God requires a rape victim to marry her attacker

Deuteronomy 22:28-29 presents one of the most morally troubling laws in the Hebrew Bible. When a man seizes an unbetrothed virgin and lies with her, he must pay her father fifty shekels of silver and marry her, with no right to divorce her.¹ Whether this describes rape or seduction is debated, but either way the woman's agency is absent and marriage to her violator is the mandatory outcome.² What does this law reveal about biblical values regarding women, consent, and justice?

What the text says

The passage appears in the context of sexual offenses in Deuteronomy 22. The English Standard Version translates verses 28-29 as follows:

"If a man meets a virgin who is not betrothed, and seizes her and lies with her, and they are found, then the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife, because he has violated her. He may not divorce her all his days." Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (ESV)¹

The key elements: the man "seizes" the woman, "lies with her," they are "found," he pays fifty shekels to her father, and marriage is mandatory with no option for divorce.¹ The woman's consent or refusal is never mentioned.

The parallel passage in Exodus 22:16-17 addresses a similar scenario but uses different language and includes a crucial provision:

"If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and lies with her, he shall give the bride-price for her and make her his wife. If her father utterly refuses to give her to him, he shall pay money equal to the bride-price for virgins." Exodus 22:16-17 (ESV)³

The Exodus passage explicitly gives the father the right to refuse the marriage while still collecting the bride-price.³ Deuteronomy 22:28-29, by contrast, does not mention this option, leading to questions about whether the father (or the woman) could refuse the marriage under Deuteronomic law.⁴

The contested Hebrew terminology

Whether Deuteronomy 22:28-29 describes forcible rape or consensual seduction depends on how one reads the Hebrew verbs in the passage.

Taphas: seize or lay hold

The Hebrew verb in verse 28 translated "seizes" is תָּפַשׂ (taphas), a root meaning "to manipulate" or "to seize; chiefly to capture, wield."⁵ Modern translations render it "to seize," while older versions preferred "to lay hold on."⁶

This is a different verb from the one in verse 25, which describes unambiguous rape. There the Hebrew is חָזַק (chazaq), a verb with a broad semantic range including "to be strong," "to seize," "to overpower," and "to prevail." While not exclusively a term for sexual assault, chazaq is the verb consistently used in biblical Hebrew when the context indicates forcible overpowering, as in the rape of Tamar (2 Samuel 13:14).⁷ The switch from chazaq in verse 25 to taphas in verse 28 suggests to some scholars that the two passages describe different scenarios: forcible rape in verse 25, seduction or consensual relations in verse 28.⁸

Other scholars counter that taphas can carry coercive connotations depending on context, and the vocabulary change does not necessarily indicate consent.⁹ The verb does not inherently mean force, but it can describe force or capture.⁵

Innah: violate, humble, or afflict

The second crucial verb appears in verse 29: עִנָּה (innah), translated "violated her" in the ESV. This Hebrew verb appears in the piel (intensifying) form, which adds force to the meaning.¹⁰ The root verb anah can mean "to humble," "to afflict," or "to violate."¹⁰

Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible—Judges 20:5 and 2 Samuel 13:14—innah describes a man forcing a woman to have sex against her will.¹⁰ In 2 Samuel 13, Amnon seizes his half-sister Tamar and, despite her explicit refusal and pleas, overpowers and rapes her; the text uses innah for the act.¹¹

Yet innah can also describe mistreatment or humiliation more broadly, and some scholars argue that in the legal context of Deuteronomy 22 it refers to the violation of social norms and the woman's devaluation rather than violent rape specifically.¹² If the text intended to describe the same crime as verse 25, why switch vocabulary?⁷

Betulah: virgin or young woman

The passage specifies that the woman is a na'arah betulah—a young woman of marriageable age who is a virgin.¹³ The Hebrew betulah derives from the root btl, meaning "to sever" or "to separate," designating a woman who has had no sexual experience.¹³

In ancient Israelite society, a woman's virginity was directly tied to her marriageability and her family's economic security.¹⁴ A woman who lost her virginity outside marriage, whether by rape or seduction, risked permanent marginalization—left destitute with no prospects.¹⁴ This social reality forms the backdrop for understanding the law's purpose.

The scholarly debate

Both interpretations have significant support, and the ambiguities in the Hebrew text make definitive resolution unlikely.¹⁵

The seduction interpretation

Scholars who argue for a seduction interpretation point to several factors. First, the use of taphas rather than chazaq suggests a different scenario from the clear rape case in verse 25.⁸ Second, the parallel passage in Exodus 22:16-17 explicitly uses the verb "seduces" and describes the same basic legal situation: a man has sex with an unbetrothed virgin, must pay the bride-price, and is obligated to marry her.³ Third, if both passages describe the same situation, Exodus explicitly allows the father to refuse the marriage, suggesting that Deuteronomy should be read the same way even though it does not explicitly state this provision.¹⁶

On this reading, the law addresses consensual but illicit premarital sex. The man has compromised the woman's virginity and therefore her marriageability; he must compensate her father with the bride-price and marry her, assuming the father and woman consent.¹⁷ The prohibition on divorce protects the woman from being discarded after the man has damaged her reputation.¹⁸

The rape interpretation

Scholars who argue for a rape interpretation emphasize the use of innah in the piel form, which in other biblical contexts clearly describes sexual assault.¹⁰ The verb taphas, while not as explicitly forceful as chazaq, can carry coercive connotations of seizing or grabbing.⁹ The phrase "and they are found" suggests that the act was discovered or that there was some public knowledge of it, which would be more consistent with an assault scenario than with consensual sex conducted in secret.¹⁹

Moreover, the absence of the father's right of refusal in Deuteronomy—present in Exodus—may indicate that this is a more serious offense requiring mandatory marriage regardless of the wishes of the father or the woman.² On this reading, the law mandates that a rapist marry his victim and can never divorce her, trapping her in a lifelong marriage to her attacker.²⁰

Comparison of Hebrew verbs in Deuteronomy 22^{1, 5, 7, 10}

The interpretive difficulty is genuine.¹⁵ What is clear is that the text itself provides no indication of the woman's consent or agency in determining the outcome.

Context in ancient Near Eastern law

Comparing this law to other ancient Near Eastern legal codes sharpens the picture.

Code of Hammurabi

The Code of Hammurabi, composed around 1750 BCE in Babylon, contained provisions addressing rape and sexual misconduct.²¹ The code allowed the raped woman to marry whomever she wanted, giving the victim agency in selecting her spouse rather than forcing marriage to the rapist.²¹ This represents a significant difference from the Deuteronomic law, which mandates marriage to the offender.

Middle Assyrian Laws

The Middle Assyrian Laws (MAL), developed between 1450 and 1250 BCE, dealt extensively with sexual offenses including rape, and were generally more brutal than Babylonian law.²² If a man seized a married woman by force and raped her, the elders would put him to death.²³ For unmarried women living in their father's house, the law included provisions similar to Deuteronomy, including financial compensation to the father.²³

A disturbing feature of the MAL was punishing rape with the rape of the rapist's wife—vicarious measure-for-measure.²⁴ Similar provisions appear in the Laws of Hammurabi, but none appear in the biblical collections, which restrict punishment to the perpetrator.²⁴ This represents a genuine moral advance: innocent family members are not punished for the offender's crime.

The bride price

The fifty shekels of silver specified in Deuteronomy 22:29 was a substantial sum.¹ Documents from Mesopotamia and Canaan show that typical bride-prices ranged from 30 to 50 shekels, putting this at the top end.²⁵ A hired laborer earned about one shekel per month, so fifty shekels represented several years of income.²⁶

The bride price, known as mohar, was paid by the groom's family to the bride's father to transfer authority over the woman from father to husband—both compensation and a demonstration of serious intent.²⁷

In the context of Deuteronomy 22:28-29, the payment compensates the father for the loss of his daughter's virginity and therefore her reduced marriageability.²⁸ The woman herself receives nothing; the payment goes to her father, reflecting the patriarchal structure in which women were viewed as property transferred from father to husband.²⁹

Women's agency in biblical law

The passage does not ask for the woman's consent to the marriage, does not give her an explicit right to refuse, and does not acknowledge her as an independent agent in determining her future.³⁰

In ancient Israel's patriarchal household, no one was fully autonomous—not even the patriarch—so constraints on women must be understood within this broader family structure.³¹ Still, women's lack of agency was far more severe than men's. The male head of the family had great power to contract marriages for his children, with girls leaving their father's house to enter the dominion of the husband's family.³²

Biblical law did include some protections for women's consent. Marriage required the woman's agreement, and documents had to be written in her name.³³ However, a ketannah (girl between ages 3-12) was subject to her father's authority, who could arrange her marriage without her consent; only after reaching maturity would her agreement be required.³⁴

Deuteronomy 22:28-29 is silent on whether the woman or her father could refuse. Exodus 22:16-17 explicitly allows the father to refuse, but Deuteronomy does not mention this option.^{3, 1} Some scholars read the Exodus provision into Deuteronomy as an unstated assumption; others treat Deuteronomy's silence as significant—the marriage was mandatory.³⁵

The deeper question is what consent means in a patriarchal society that structurally denied women autonomy.³⁶ Even if the father could refuse the marriage based on the Exodus parallel, the woman's own voice is absent from the legal formula.

Apologetic defenses

Defenders of the biblical text have offered several arguments to soften the moral difficulties.

The "this was protective, not punitive" defense

A common argument is that the law protected the woman rather than punishing her.³⁷ In the ancient world, an unmarried woman who had lost her virginity had little hope for economic stability, as no other man would marry her.³⁸ Requiring the offender to marry her and never divorce her guaranteed financial support and social standing.³⁹

This has some merit. The divorce prohibition genuinely prevents the man from using the woman and then discarding her.⁴⁰ In a society where women depended on male relatives for survival, guaranteed marriage provided otherwise unavailable security.⁴¹

But the defense assumes that being permanently bound to the man who violated you is preferable to remaining unmarried. That may have been true in ancient Israel, where unmarried women faced extreme hardship—but this reflects the structural injustice of that society rather than excusing the law.⁴² A truly just law would have given the woman both protection and choice.

The "it's about seduction, not rape" defense

Some scholars and apologists argue the passage describes consensual seduction rather than rape, based on the Hebrew terminology and the Exodus parallel.⁸ On this reading, the couple engaged in premarital sex and the law requires the man to take responsibility by paying the bride-price and marrying her.¹⁷

Even so, moral problems remain. If the encounter was consensual, why is only the man penalized? The woman's consent is not mentioned, nor is her desire to marry him. The law treats the situation as a transaction between the man and the woman's father.⁴³ She is the object of the transaction, not a participant.

The prohibition on divorce applies whether the scenario is rape or seduction. If a young woman was seduced and the relationship was consensual, why should she be permanently bound to this man with no possibility of escape if the marriage becomes abusive?⁴⁴ The law gives the man a wife and forbids him from divorcing her, but offers the woman no corresponding protection or choice.

The "the father could refuse" defense

Some apologists point to Exodus 22:17, which allows the father to refuse the marriage, and argue this provision applies to Deuteronomy 22:28-29 even though it is unstated.¹⁶ On this view, no one was forced; the law merely required the man to offer marriage and pay the bride-price.⁴⁵

This is plausible but not certain. If Deuteronomy intended to incorporate the father's right of refusal, why not state it as Exodus does? Legal codes typically include relevant provisions rather than expecting readers to import them from other texts.³⁵

And even if the father could refuse, the woman's agency is still absent. The decision rests with her father, not with her.⁴⁶

The "you can't judge ancient cultures by modern standards" defense

A final strategy argues that judging ancient Israelite law by modern standards is anachronistic.⁴⁷ All ancient societies were patriarchal, women's rights did not exist, and biblical law should be evaluated against its Near Eastern context rather than 21st-century values.⁴⁸

As history, this has some validity. By ancient Near Eastern standards, the law includes relatively humane features: no vicarious punishment of the offender's family, a divorce prohibition providing the woman some security, and substantial financial compensation.⁴⁹

But this defense collapses when applied to the Bible's central claim: that it represents the word of a perfectly good and just God. If biblical law is merely a product of its time, it cannot be eternal moral truth. If God accommodated ancient patriarchal values, the law reflects human moral limitations rather than divine perfection.⁵⁰ Believers who hold that the Bible is divinely inspired must grapple with why God would command a law that treats women as property.

Theological implications

Whether it addresses rape or seduction, this law treats women as objects of transaction between men.⁵¹ The woman cannot refuse marriage to the man who violated her, has no voice in the proceedings, and receives none of the financial compensation—that goes to her father.⁵²

Some theologians argue these laws represent God's accommodation to fallen human society—working within patriarchal structures while gradually moving humanity toward justice.⁵³ On this view, the law improved on the alternatives available to women in that culture, even if it falls short of ideal justice.⁵⁴

This accommodationist approach preserves both biblical authority and moral sensibility, but raises a difficult follow-up: if God accommodated unjust social structures, how do we know which parts of the Bible reflect eternal moral truth and which reflect temporary compromise? By what standard do we distinguish them?⁵⁵

Other theologians argue more directly that this passage reflects ancient Israelite values rather than timeless divine commands, and that the Bible is a human document recording Israel's evolving understanding of God.⁵⁶ This preserves moral clarity but abandons traditional claims about biblical inerrancy.

The fundamental moral problem

Setting aside the scholarly debate and the apologetic defenses, the core moral problem remains: Deuteronomy 22:28-29 treats a woman as property rather than as a person.

Her voice is absent. Her consent is not sought. Her wishes are not considered. Compensation for her lost virginity goes to her father. The decision about marriage rests with men—the father and the offender—not with the woman whose life is most directly affected.⁵⁷

If the law addresses rape, it mandates that a victim marry her rapist for life with no escape. If it addresses seduction, it still removes the woman's agency and treats her sexual activity as damage to her father's property requiring compensation and transfer of ownership.

The divorce prohibition, offered as protective, is protective only in the narrow sense of guaranteeing economic support. It does not protect her from living with the man who violated her, from abuse, or from a lifetime of unwanted intimacy. It never asks the woman what she prefers.⁵⁸

Modern readers generally agree that rape victims should not be required to marry their rapists, that women should choose whom they marry, and that consent is a prerequisite for just relationships.⁵⁹ These are not merely modern preferences—they reflect fundamental moral truths about human dignity and autonomy.

Deuteronomy 22:28-29 violates these principles. It may have improved on other ancient Near Eastern arrangements and provided a form of protection in a deeply patriarchal society, but it does not reflect moral perfection. It reflects a culture in which women were subordinate to men, a woman's value was tied to her virginity, and her father determined her future.⁶⁰

Conclusion

Whether this law addresses rape or seduction, and whether the father could implicitly refuse, the result is the same: women are treated as property, their agency is absent, and their consent is not required. A man who seizes an unbetrothed virgin must pay her father fifty shekels and marry her, permanently.

Every apologetic reframing runs into the same wall. The accommodation argument raises the question of which biblical commands are eternal and which are cultural. The protection argument does not explain why a just God would not also provide agency. The seduction argument does not address the underlying problem of treating women as objects of transaction.

The simplest explanation is that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 reflects the values and limitations of ancient Israelite society, not the moral perfection of a divine lawgiver. It may have been progressive by ancient Near Eastern standards, but it is not just by any standard that respects women's autonomy, dignity, and agency.